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In keeping with the Conference theme of ‘the altered states of adult education’, this paper 
explores the application and implication of a psychoanalytically-informed practice for the 
field of adult education.  Although this call for an ‘altered state’ of practice may seem 
somewhat novel, it emits from what Pitt, Robertson, and Todd describe as ‘a renewed 
interest in the implications of psychoanalytic theory for educational studies.’1 The three 
suggest that because this ‘renewed interest’ in psychoanalysis ‘has occurred within… the 
“postdisciplinary” atmosphere of the academy’, it constitutes ‘not just a rereading of the 
immediate textual past (although it is that), but also a reading with, an openness to 
exploring with an oft-times eclectic spirit, what psychoanalysis and education have to 
offer one another’.  Reading psychoanalysis with education, however, also entails 
‘moving beyond the “what” of knowledge and beyond the disciplines that structure such 
knowledge within the academy—for the very modes of intelligibility and certainty that 
disciplines offer are, of course, precisely what a reading of psychoanalysis with education 
undermines’.  Unfortunately, many of the ‘eclectic’, ‘postdisciplinary’ readings of 
psychoanalysis with education that have resulted move beyond intelligibility and 
certainty by relinquishing all hope of truth, which renders them indistinguishable from 
postmodern and poststructuralist readings of education.   
 
Such post-prefixed ‘remedies’ to scientism, however, have proven too bitter a pill for 
many adult educators to swallow.2 Few, in fact, are willing to abandon themselves to the 
play of the signifier, to trade certainty and the promise of truth for the ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of language.  The desire for certainty has proven so strong, in fact, that 
some adult educators have (re)turned to scientific notions of knowledge and truth rather 
than enter the quagmire of linguistic indeterminacy.  This, of course, raises the question 
of whether it is possible to move ‘beyond the “what” of knowledge’ without abandoning 
‘intelligibility and certainty’? The answer to this question is Yes, but not without a 
significant shift in thinking.  The work of Jacques Lacan, in fact, provides the basis for 
such a move, but to accomplish the requisite shift in thinking adult educators must be 
willing to learn psychoanalytically, to forego understanding in favour of trust.  By 
explaining not only why adult educators should, but also how they can, undertake this 
shift in thinking, this paper illustrates how a psychoanalytically-informed adult education 
practice can move the field beyond its current either/or impasse:  of a practice based 
either on scientific certainty or linguistic indeterminacy.   
Lacanian versus Scientific Certainty 
Science, although it can deliver certainty, does so at a cost—certainty is attainable only in 
the realm of knowledge, in the Symbolic domain of language and formal relations.  This 
is because science restricts its focus to those aspects of the Real that can be formalized 
and domesticated.  The Real for Lacan, however, is more than that which precedes 
symbolization;  it is also that which refuses to be formalized and domesticated, that 
which always eludes capture within a system.  But the Real and Symbolic are only two of 
the three registers that inform Lacan’s work, the other being the Imaginary.  These three 
realms, moreover, although they can be distinguished conceptually, are inextricably 
linked for Lacan, much like the strands of a Borromean knot.  In brief, the Real is the 
realm of affects and instincts, the Symbolic that of language and formal systems, and the 
Imaginary that of perception and images.   
 
Science, by wresting from the Real that which is amenable to capture within the confines 
of formal structures, delivers certainty.  But in the very process of subjecting the Real to 
language, the word displaces and “kills” the very thing it seeks to capture, much as 
vivisecting the nightingale to learn how it sings destroys its song.  This is the price 
science must pay for certainty.  Lacan, however, offers another notion of certainty, one 
that is also grounded in truth but which eludes the grasp of knowledge.  By turning his 
attention from the Symbolic to the Real, to that which resists formalization, Lacan 
grounds certainty in the very thing that science chooses to ignore, in what science must 
overlook to make certainty possible—the truth. 
Lacanian versus Scientific Truth 
Science, of course, has a very specific notion of truth, but it is a notion located squarely 
in the Symbolic, in the domain of knowledge.  Consequently, conceived as such, truth 
cannot deliver a notion of certainty other than that already embraced by science.  
Scientific truth, in fact, is nothing more than the accumulation of knowledge around a 
claim, an hypothesis, and scientific certainty is not, in fact, something distinct from 
knowledge but rather its accumulation.  As Theresa Giron notes, for example: 
 
Newton’s Law, the ‘best corroborated law in history,’ rises to the level of 
scientific truth not because it suggests a certainty that is not that of 
knowledge, but because the law becomes the very site of the coagulation 
of knowledge (as evidence or corroborated proof). 
 
The scientific notion of truth, then, is linear, progressive, and cumulative—equivalent to 
the accumulation of knowledge to the point of certainty.  The truth of psychoanalysis, 
however, is not located in the realm of knowledge, the Symbolic, but in that which 
science must exclude to make knowledge possible, the Real.  In Kantian terms, the locale 
of psychoanalytic truth is the very ground for the possibility of knowledge.  As opposed 
to science’s cummulative notion of truth, then, the psychoanalytic notion is subtractive—
psychoanalytic truth is that which must be excluded to make knowledge possible.  It is 
this conception of truth as a hole in the very fabric of knowledge, as that which can never 
be symbolized, that serves as the basis for a notion of certainty other than that advanced 
by science.   
 
It should now be apparent that science, in the very act of creating knowledge, creates not 
one but two domains:  the domain of that which can be known, and the domain of that 
which cannot—of that which, necessarily, resides beyond the scope of science.  Science, 
then, makes certainty in the domain of knowledge possible by covering over the place of 
truth.  Psychoanalysis, however, makes possible a certainty outside the domain of 
knowledge possible by uncovering the place in which it resides:  truth.  Consequently, 
science and psychoanalysis are not in competition, for science’s object of study is the 
knowable, while psychoanalysis’s is the unknowable.  In fact, it is at the point where 
knowledge fails, or as Lacan puts it, where “it limps,” that psychoanalysis’s task begins.  
3
 Psychoanalysis, then, does not reject the search for certainty and truth;  in fact, it 
constitutes a science of truth:  in attributing the signifier “impossible” to truth, it allows 
truth to be symbolized.  This is what sets psychoanalysis apart from postmodernism and 
poststructuralism.  This is why Slavoj ZiZek (1989, pp.  153–154) argues that to label 
Lacan a poststructuralist is to ignore ‘the radical break that separates him from the field 
of “post-structuralism”’, to overlook how ‘even the propositions common to the two 
fields obtain a totally different dimension in each’.  Lacan’s claim that ‘there is no 
metalanguage’, for instance, or ‘his thesis that truth is structured like a fiction’ has, Zizek 
points out, ‘nothing at all to do with a post-structuralist reduction of the truth dimension 
to a textual “truth-effect”’.  Lacan is singular in his insistence of ‘psychoanalysis as a 
truth-experience’. 
 
Psychoanalysis, then, makes it possible to have a science of truth by focusing on the 
object that science creates at the moment of its constitution but cannot take as an object 
of study (because it lies outside of its constitutive limits, where there is nothing to know).  
For science, truth is impossible, a mere absence that can never be known, but for 
psychoanalysis, although truth remains impossible, it’s absence can be formalized, 
marked as an empty space, a space that can be occupied by various objects.  Unlike 
science, psychoanalysis does not concern itself with truth per se but rather the place truth 
occupies in any system.  By concentrating not on its nature but the place it occupies in 
any system, it is possible to arrive at the psychoanalytic understanding of truth.   
Psychoanalytic versus Converntional Learning 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, learning is what occurs in the pursuit of knowledge, 
not its understanding:  it is what ‘falls into place’ on one level when we are willing to 
‘bracket’ our understanding on another.  This, of course, runs counter to what most adult 
educators understand learning to be—it makes no sense from the perspective of 
traditional conceptions of ‘knowledge’, ‘understanding’, and ‘learning’.  From a 
Lacanian perspective, however, to truly know, to truly understand, or to truly learn 
something, we have to be willing to give up, or at least bracket, our conventional notions 
of ‘knowledge’, ‘understanding,’ and ‘learning’.  This, of course, means the adult 
educator looking to ‘learn’ Lacanian psychoanalysis, to ‘understand’ it, may well find 
her/himself in the unenviable but comical position of a character in a well-known joke—
of the traveler who asks for directions and is told:  ‘You can’t get there from here’.  The 
Lacanian point is that we cannot get there (to a true understanding) from here (from a 
conventional notion of ‘understanding’);  this is why trust (or as it is known in 
psychoanalysis, transference), not ‘understanding’, is the key to true learning.4  
 
However, because the waters of Lacanian psychoanalysis appear so murky and deep, it 
seems almost irresponsible to plunge into their cloudy depths, to trust, before one is an 
accomplished swimmer, before one ‘understands’.  The problem any would-be-swimmer 
faces, of course, is that s/he can only learn to swim in the water—the gap between 
‘understanding’ swimming (the principles of buoyancy and the various techniques and 
strokes of swimming) and swimming itself can never be closed through ‘learning’, 
through the acquisition of more ‘knowledge’.  Learning to swim entails getting into the 
water before one can swim—an act of trust.  Fortunately, the nature of trust, of 
transference, is such that its effects are not curbed by the learner’s struggle to 
‘understand’.  For, as Lacan (1981, p.  232) notes:  ‘as soon as the subject who is 
supposed to know exists somewhere… (sujet supposé savoir)… there is transference’, 
and where there is transference there is an opportunity for psychoanalytic learning.   
Those In the Know Are Lost 
Consequently, adult educators who wish to ‘learn’ Lacanian psychoanalysis, to 
‘understand’ it, must come to recognize that they will not arrive at a true understanding 
unless they are willing to pursue their goal through trust rather than ‘understanding’.  
This is not, however, to suggest they must accept what Lacanian psychoanalysis has to 
say without question;  it is perfectly acceptable to maintain a skeptical attitude.  Those 
who do so, in fact, will be no different from the analysand who begins analysis suspicious 
of the analyst’s ability to deliver what s/he seeks—who is, so to speak, ‘in the know’.  
Such analysands may well catch the analyst in an error of ‘knowledge’, in an 
inconsistency or contradiction, just as educators in pursuit of psychoanalytic knowledge 
may well catch Lacan or his commentators in errors of ‘logic’, but this is actually of little 
consequence—as Lacan is so fond of remarking, those in the know are lost (les non-
dupes errent), are already in the grip of transference.  To learn psychoanalytically, then, 
the analysand/learner must proceed on trust, proceed as if the analyst/text has the 
knowledge he or she lacks, despite her/his misgivings. 
 
That psychoanalytic learning occurs once the learner proceeds on trust, proceeds as if the 
text has knowledge s/he lacks, is one of the lessons this paper sets out to teach;  the other 
is that psychoanalytic knowledge is learned in the pursuit of truth, not its attainment:  ‘the 
truth… is that which runs after the truth’ (Lacan, 1981, p.  188).  If Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is true, however, if ‘the truth… is that which runs after the truth’, if 
knowledge, understanding, and learning do not correspond to what we ‘understand’ them 
to be (as our ‘understanding’ of swimming does not correspond to actual swimming), this 
truth is not amenable to being ‘learned’ or ‘understood’.  How, then, to teach it?  
The Goal versus the Aim of Learning 
In a seminar on the drives, ‘The Partial Drive and Its Circuit’, Lacan (1981, p.  179) 
offers a clue as to how psychoanalytic truth can be taught when he distinguishes between 
a drive’s goal (that which it pursues) and its aim (the path it follows in pursuit of its 
goal):  ‘when you entrust someone with a mission, the aim is not what he brings back, but 
the itinerary he must take.  The aim is the way taken.  The French word but may be 
translated by another word in English, goal’.  Lacan’s point in this passage is that a 
drive’s true purpose, its truth, is not its goal (that which it pursues), but its aim (that 
which it brings about in the pursuit of its goal).  This suggests the truth of any ‘mission’ 
resides not in its professed goal but its aim.  The pedagogical implications of Lacan’s 
point are significant.   
 
Take, for instance, an adult educator who undertakes a mission to teach that Paulo 
Freire’s (1987) language-based, participatory model of learning is how learning truly 
proceeds, that the traditional transmission model of learning, what Freire terms the 
‘banking’ model, is a misrepresentation of learning.  The adult educator’s goal may very 
well be to teach this truth, but what s/he actually teaches is what s/he brings about in the 
pursuit of that goal.  An adult educator who, for example, elaborates on the various 
elements that comprise Freire’s pedagogy, whether through a lecture or interactive 
discussion, does not teach her/his students the truth of Freire’s model, no matter how 
extensive or participatory the lesson;  what s/he teaches is the truth of the ‘banking’ 
model—that knowledge can be transmitted as an accomplished fact.  It would be a fatal 
mistake, however, if that same adult educator simply sat her/his students in a ‘culture 
circle’ and engaged them in a ‘dialogue’, in a discussion of ‘generative themes’, ‘naming 
the world’, and ‘conscientization’—this teaches only that truth cannot be taught, that the 
learner, if s/he is to learn the truth of Freire’s pedagogy, must learn it for her/himself.  A 
central tenet of Lacanian psychoanalysis, however, is that the analysand/learner cannot 
access truth her/himself—there must be an other, a subject presumed to know.  Learning 
the truth ‘is not a matter of being open, nor is it something you can do by yourself.… You 
need an other.  It’s quite mysterious the way you need an other.  If we take the example 
of Freud himself, it looks like he did it alone [learned the truth of psychoanalysis], but in 
fact he did it in reference to another, his friend Wilhelm Fliess’ (Miller, 1995, p.  235).   
The Pursuit of Truth 
The crucial Lacanian distinction that many progressive educators overlook, then, is that 
just because truth cannot be ‘taught’, that is, transmitted from educator to learner, does 
not mean that the learner must learn truth her/himself, that s/he is free to choose whatever  
truth s/he wishes.  Lacan spent decades in the clinic and in seminars teaching analysands 
and analysts how to arrive at the truth.  For Lacan, teaching the truth entails teaching the 
conditions that make it possible to learn truth.  To teach these conditions, however, the 
teacher must first engage the learner in the pursuit of ‘truth’—sustain the learner’s belief 
that ‘learning’ entails the acquisition of ‘knowledge’ and that the s/he possesses the 
‘knowledge’ the learner lacks.  Only then, after assuming the position of the ‘subject 
presumed to know’ and establishing ‘truth’ as a goal, is the teacher in a position to 
provide the learner with opportunities to arrive at the realization that truth is such that it 
can never be attained—that truth, as the pursued in Homer’s Illiad (Hector), always 
remains in sight, but out of the pursuer’s (Achilles) reach;  that Minerva’s owl 
(‘understanding’) always flies at dusk, when the day remains in sight but is already past.   
 
The significance of Lacan’s notion of truth, then, is that the learner cannot collect her/his 
metaphorical $200 for passing Go and then head straight for Free Parking, to the ‘truth’;  
the learner has to ‘play the game’, continue to pursue ‘truth’, before s/he can come to 
terms with it.  The learner who feels a little perplexed at this point should not worry if 
this Lacanian notion of truth is difficult to ‘understand’—psychoanalytic learning, after 
all, entails trust, not ‘understanding’.  If it were possible to go directly to the ‘truth’ of the 
psychoanalytic notion of truth, to make it ‘understandable’, it would be false;  to be true, 
according to its own definition of truth, the psychoanalytic notion of truth must defy 
‘understanding’—ergo the need for trust.  Since truth, then, by definition, is that which 
escapes ‘understanding’, that which cannot be attained once and for all, the conditions 
that make it possible to learn truth cannot be taught as an accomplished fact, as 
‘knowledge’—otherwise, they would be untrue.   
Why Educating Is an Impossible Profession 
No doubt the vicissitudes of teaching the truth are what led Freud to declare educating 
(along with healing and governing) an ‘impossible’ profession.  The problem is that even 
when teaching psychoanalytic truth is established as a goal, it can only be taught as an 
aim—the truth, by definition, is that which is taught as an aim.  Freud, for instance, did 
not teach the truth of psychoanalysis as an accomplished fact.  He taught, rather, the 
oftentimes convoluted trail (the interpretation of dreams and various case studies) that 
made it possible for him to learn the truth of psychoanalysis;  as Lacan taught the 
meandering, circuitous path (his rereading of Freud) that made it possible for him to learn 
the same.  It is through his rereading of Freud, in fact, that Lacan demonstrates how, even 
when Freud’s professed goal was to teach psychoanalytic truth as ‘knowledge’, as a 
biological science, his aim was always to teach psychoanalysis as that which confounds 
scientific ‘understanding’.  Freud was absolutely correct, then, when he declared 
educating an impossible profession:  truth is precisely that which cannot be ‘understood’, 
that which cannot be ‘learned’ through the transmission of ‘knowledge’.   
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2 Habermas (1972, p.  4) describes scientism as ‘the conviction that we can no longer 
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 As Zizek (1989, p.  118) notes:  ‘the cause is always the cause of something which goes 
wrong, which is amiss [the French “ça cloche”:  it limps]:  it could be said that 
                                                                                                                                            
causality—the usual, “normal” linear chain of causes—is a defence against the cause 
with which we are concerned in psychoanalysis’. 
4 Fink (1995, p.  71), in fact, insists that ‘true understanding’ is ‘a misnomer, in that 
understanding is precisely short-circuited, unnecessary, irrelevant to the process.  What is 
really implied is that something changes, and that is the point of Lacanian analysis as 
well:  something takes place at the border of the symbolic and real which has nothing to 
do with understanding’.    
